Capital requirements and risk weighted assets analysis of portuguese banks with comparable EU Banks by Carvalho, Miguel
1 
 
A Work Project, presented as part of the requirements for the Award of a Master 
Degree in Finance from the NOVA – School of Business and Economics 
 
 
 
CAPITAL REQUIREMENTS AND RISK WEIGHTED    
ASSETS ANALYSIS OF PORTUGUESE BANKS                                 
WITH COMPARABLE EU BANKS 
 
 
 
Miguel Cabrita Santos Roque de Carvalho - Student Number 3927 
 
 
 
A Project carried out on the Masters in Finance course, under the supervision of: 
 
Professor: Filipa Castro 
 
 
January 2019 
 
 
 
 
 
I would like to thank my advisor Filipa Castro for her availability and support and also my coworkers from EY for 
their flexibility and knowledge sharing, particularly Rodolfo Pinto, Artur Côto, Leonor Peleja and Rita Costa.  
I dedicate this work project to my parents, sister and all the professors that I had during my academic journey due 
to their support, dedication and inspiration in contributing to the person that I am today. I really appreciate from 
the bottom of my heart all that you did for me ever since I joined Jardim Escola João de Deus 20 years ago. 
Last but not least, I would like to acknowledge the motivation and trust that my grandparents, uncles, aunts, cousins 
and friends put on me – amongst many others, thank you Mariana, Mafalda, Cátia, Rita, Pedro, Bernardo, António, 
Vasco, Filipe, Paulo, Gonçalo.  
2 
 
 
 
 
 
 
CAPITAL REQUIREMENTS AND RISK WEIGHTED                   
ASSETS ANALYSIS OF PORTUGUESE BANKS                                                         
WITH COMPARABLE EU BANKS 
 
 
 
Abstract 
 
Departing from an extensive period of financial instability across the European banking 
industry, this work aims to study the capital adequacy of six major Portuguese Institutions. 
Portuguese Banks were divided in two different sets according to their size and 60 EU banks 
allocated according to their RWAs proximity. Despite complying with the minimal capital 
requirements and attaining in recent year an enhancement in the capital ratio higher than their 
peers, Portuguese Banks are still considerably undercapitalized. Contrarily to abroad, instead 
of a rise in own funds the catalyst was an expressive reduction of the RWAs from Credit Risk. 
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1. Research Question 
 In order to comply with the objectives of the Direct Research Internship standard track, 
the work project addresses a business research question of interest for the company where the 
internship occurs. Having started working in risk management on the Financial Services 
Advisory department of EY Portugal, the banking industry is a sector of major interest. EY, 
formerly known as Ernst and Young, is a multinational corporation founded in 1989 as a 
consequence of the merge of two accountancy firms, Ernst & Whinney and Arthur Young & 
Co. With a workforce of 261 thousand employees it accomplished 34,8 billion dollars of global 
revenues in 2018 fiscal year. Similarly to the remaining “Big Four”, Assurance and Advisory 
at EY comprise the main source of revenue. 
 To successfully respond to the increasingly complexity of the Financial Services clients’ 
needs, EY disintegrates the professionals of this industry from the remaining ones across all 
service lines. Consequently, cooperation and efficiency are enhanced and employees have the 
opportunity to emphasize their know-how on a demanding industry with a systemic role in the 
overall economy. Given a regulatory framework in transformation and the increasingly 
complexity of its processes and methodologies, a study which addresses the current context of 
prudential supervision in respect to the effectiveness of banks in managing their capital is of 
foremost importance for the FSO Advisory department at EY Portugal.  
 The business research question to be considered has taken into account that banks, apart 
from complying with the regulatory requirements, must also gather a sense of assessment with 
their peers. Therefore, “How homogeneous are Portuguese banks in respect to their compliance 
with Capital Requirements and their Risk Weighted Assets in respect to EU banks with 
comparable exposure value of Credit Risk?” is the question that will be targeted with this study. 
However, to gather a sense of appraisal it is of necessary to start with an assessment of the 
regulatory framework throughout time and the extrapolation of forthcoming reforms. 
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2. Regulatory contextualization  
 Despite the benefits associated with the banking system, not always have our ancestors 
been able to take them for granted with the same acceptance as of today. Europe was Christian 
and the Bible strictly forbidden usury, “do not charge your brother interest on money, food, or 
any other type of loan” (Deuteronomy 23:19). In this sense, despite only having flourished in 
more recent centuries, banks exponential development progressed into what has become today 
a fully integrated global financial system.  
 By applying fractional reserves institutions create money when they conceive loans 
since they are not required to preserve 100% of the capital received from deposit liabilities. As 
the 2008 financial crisis validated, during periods of financial and economic difficulties the 
proliferation of negative externalities from banks in distress to the economy is enhanced. With 
people’s perception of the industry being deteriorated even institutions with a respectable 
financial strength may face complications. On the prospect of a bank run the possibility to clear 
demand by applying a policy of withdraws below par does not exist. In this sense, sound 
liquidity risk management with controls for maturity mismatches is essential to ensure that 
banks have the necessary means to honour their compromises. 
 Theoretically, it is inconsistent to assure with absolute certainty that money is available 
on demand under any circumstances. Nonetheless, several systemic mitigation techniques exist 
to increase trust on the financial system. In comprehensive terms, regulation assures 
transparency and sets the capital adequacy requirements. Central banks act as a lender of last 
resort to protect the aggregate money supply and deposit insurance systems assure that in case 
of bankruptcy depositors’ money is secured until a certain threshold. Despite the benefits 
associated with these practices, both government bailouts (Lammertjan Dam, Michael Koetter, 
2012) and deposit insurance systems (Apanard Angkinand, Clas Wihlborg, 2010) increase 
bank’s moral hazard in respect to their risk management practices. 
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 When it comes to the origins of the current global regulatory framework the first steps 
occurred in 1930 with the foundation of the Bank for International Settlements (BIS). 
Nevertheless, it was only in 1974, three years after the fall of the Bretton Woods System, that 
the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS) was created as a medium of recurrent 
debate for international banking supervision. Its ultimate goal was to enhance international 
stability with the improvement of the quality and homogeneity of banking regulation.  
 In July 1988, with the publication of the International convergence of capital 
measurement and capital standards, also known as the Basel Accord, a weighted approach to 
the measurement of risk ought to be complied with. Capital was divided in Core Capital or Tier 
I and Supplementary Capital or Tier II. To measure Credit Risk assets were divided into five 
categories and a common Risk Weight to each category was attributed based on the nature of 
the debtor. To lessen the impact of unexpected losses on banks solvency, institutions were 
required to set aside at least 8% of their capital in respect to the sum of their Risk Weighted 
Assets (RWAs).  
In January 1991, the risk of loss from adverse market movements, either from general 
risk or specific risk, was developed with the publication of the Amendment to the Capital 
Accord to Incorporate Market Risks. Under this document banks were required to set capital 
aside to account for exposures to foreign exchange, traded debt securities, equities, 
commodities and options. Despite being the first time that internal models were allowed, 
institutions had to acquire authorization from the regulatory entity for its usage. 
In June 1999, with the acknowledgment of banks insufficient risk management practices 
and the growing mismatch between financial innovation and the capital requirements 
framework, the BCBS issued a new proposal to rectify previous limitations. Therefore, in June 
2004 Basel II introduced under the document document an International Convergence of 
Capital Measurement and Capital Standards: A Revised Framework a comprehensive three 
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pillar approach which is still in force as of today and whose purpose was to enhance the 
economic stability of the financial system. 
The first pillar contains the quantitative rules for determining the capital requirements 
that banks must comply with. Operational risk, the risk of loss resulting from inadequate or 
failed internal processes, people and systems or from external events, was added to the 
denominator and instead of a single rudimental technique for Credit Risk, three approaches 
which will later be scrutinized in more detail could now be used (i.e. Standardised Approach, 
Internal Rating Based Approach and Foundation Internal Rating Based Approach). 
The second pillar refers to the supervisory review process. By strengthening the 
monitoring procedure of capital adequacy, it became a complement to the first pillar as rules by 
themselves are not sufficient without enforceability. Therefore, supervisors review and evaluate 
banks processes and strategies in respect to capital adequacy and ensure their compliance with 
the regulatory capital ratios. If results are deemed unsatisfactory, supervisors may act to 
mitigate the possibility of further departures from the appropriate requirements and practices.  
The third pillar is complementary to the previous two and consists in the practice of 
financial reporting to enhance market discipline. Under this framework institutions are required 
to comply with substantial disclosures in respect to the scope of application, capital structure, 
capital adequacy, risk exposures and risk assessment processes. By increasing the capability of 
markets participants to monitor banks, investors will be able to respond more efficiently to 
financial health deterioration and penalize institutions whose risk management is perceived as 
suboptimal. Thus, not only comparability and transparency are enhanced but managers will also 
have further incentives to lead institutions towards higher standards of corporate governance. 
In the sequence of the economic and financial crisis of 2007/2008, the BCBS initiated 
an on-going set of reforms to the regulatory framework under the name Basel III. With several 
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documents and respective amendments being published through the years, its completion only 
occurred in December 2017 with the publication of Basel III: Finalising post-crisis reforms. 
The main resolution of the Accord was to implement further enhancements to the three pillars 
approach. Amongst others it introduced new capital buffers, divided Tier I in two components, 
revised the Standardised approach across different types of risk, implemented an output floor 
to the capital benefits from internal models, introduced a leverage ratio, liquidity coverage ratio 
and net stable funding ratio. As legislators still need to transpose to European Law some of the 
reforms from Basel III, forthcoming alterations to current regulatory framework that Portuguese 
banks are subject to (i.e. Capital Requirements Regulation and Capital Requirements Directive 
IV) are expected. To conclude, Basel Accords constitute minimum requisites and it is up to 
jurisdictions to decide if they should go further beyond them. 
 
3. Data and Methodology 
 The data used for the analysis of banks capital requirements, own funds and RWAs 
within the European Union relies significantly on the public available data from EU-wide 
transparency exercise. This set of information is gathered from institutions supervisory reports 
and is published annually on a consolidated basis on the European Banking Authority website.  
 The database comprises information of 130 banks across 25 countries, with five out of 
those being from Portugal. Performed the first time in 2011, the most recent publication refers 
to the 2018 exercise and covers information referent to 31 December 2017 and 30 June 2018. 
Notwithstanding the possibility of investigating for prior years, most of the study will be 
focused on data from the first semester of 2018 and past information will only be considered 
when relevant for the study conducted. Since not all the information necessary for the analysis 
is present on the EU-wide transparency exercise, the retrievement of information from bank’s 
financial statements and market discipline reports was also conducted.  
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 When it comes to the determination of clusters, the selection criteria rely solely on 
institutions’ RWAs as this value is the predominant factor which defines the amount of 
regulatory capital that a bank needs to hold to operate. Therefore, Caixa Geral de Depósitos, 
Banco Comercial Português and Novo Banco were benchmarked to a group of banks with 
higher RWAs. Contrarily, Banco Português de Investimento, Caixa Económica Montepio Geral 
and Caixa Central de Crédito Agrícola Mútuo were assigned to a cluster with lower RWAs. 
Tables 1 provide a summary of the full list found in Annex 1 in respect to the 30 foreign banks 
allocated to each cluster based on their proximity to the average RWAs of Portuguese 
institutions. Therefore, Cluster Large has an average RWA of €40 268M, a standard deviation 
of €9 7057M and a coefficient of variation of 24,2%; whereas Cluster Small has for the same 
components €13 605M, €5 097M and 37,5%. 
Tables 1: RWAs of banks from Cluster Large and Cluster Small 
Cluster Large RWAs  Cluster Small RWAs 
Caixa Geral de Depósitos 49 872  Banco Português de Investimento 16 882 
Banco Comercial Português 41 793  Caixa Económica Montepio Geral 11 259 
Novo Banco 32 287  Caixa Central Crédito Agrícola Mútuo 8 909 
Peers Average 40 268  Peers Average 13 605 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
4.  Capital Requirements and Own Funds 
 As previously mentioned, for banking intuitions to legally operate within a jurisdiction 
they need to conform with certain thresholds of regulatory capital to absorb the impact of 
unexpected losses and secure solvency during periods of distress. Under the current paradigm, 
Portuguese banks need to comply with capital adequacy standards from the Capital 
Requirements Regulation, additional buffers from the Capital Requirements Directive IV (i.e. 
Systemically Important Institutions, Capital Conservation and Countercyclical Capital buffers) 
and pillar 2 capital requirements.  
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 In respect to Article 92 of the Capital Requirements Regulation, banks are required to 
fulfil a minimum Common Equity Tier 1 ratio of 4,5%, a Tier 1 ratio of 6% and a total capital 
ratio of 8%. Since all the remaining capital requirements subsequently presented need to be 
fulfilled with Common Equity Tier 1 capital, differences between ratios arise from these values. 
 According to EBA’s 2018 listing, there were no Portuguese institutions amongst the 36 
assigned as Global-Systemically Important Banks. Even though under these circumstances the 
G-SIB conservation buffer is not applicable, Bank of Portugal may enforce additional capital 
requirements between 0% and 2% to Other-Systemically Important Institutions to mitigate 
eventual externalities from their enhanced dimensions: 
   Table 2: O-SII buffer applicable to Portuguese Banks as a percentage of total RWA 
 2018 2 019 2020 2021 
Caixa Geral de Depósitos 0,25% 0,5% 0,75% 1% 
Banco Comercial Português 0,188% 0,375% 0,563% 0,75% 
Novo Banco 0,125% 0,25% 0,375% 0,5% 
Banco Português de Investimento 0,125% 0,25% 0,375% 0,5% 
Caixa Económica Montepio Geral 0,063% 0,125% 0,188% 0,25% 
 
  
 Introduced in 2016 through a phased-in approach which started at 0,6%, the Capital 
Conservation buffer was 1,25% in 2017, 1,875% in 2018 and will reach its ceiling value of 
2,5% in 2019. 
  The Countercyclical Capital buffer is a macroprudential tool which may increase banks’ 
capital requirements until a threshold of 2,5%. Theoretically, it should be augmented by 
regulators during periods of economic growth and subsequently lowered during distress 
situations. According to the European Systemic Risk Board, 6 out of 30 European countries are 
currently applying this buffer, ranging from 1% to 2% and attaining an average of 1,42%. 
 When it comes to pillar 2 capital requirements attributed annually to each institution, 
the ratio will differ according to the results descendant from the Supervisory Review Evaluation 
Process. The methodology for its applicability is based on the principle of proportionality and 
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apart from accounting for banks dimension, systemic importance and the complexity of its 
operations, also relies on an assessment analysis of business model, internal governance, risk 
management, risks to capital, liquidity and funding. For the year 2018 Caixa Geral de 
Depósitos, Banco Comercial Português and Banco Português de Investimento were required to 
comply with a ratio of 2,25% and Caixa Económica Montepio Geral of 3%.  
 Table 3 summarizes the capital requirements for each Portuguese bank for 2019. Pillar 
2* requisites for Novo Banco and Caixa Central Crédito Agrícola Mútuo are assumed to be 
2,5% and for the reminiscent banks the values from 2018 are expected to remain constant for 
the following year.  
Table 3: 2019 capital requirements for Portuguese Banks 
  
Caixa 
Geral de 
Depósitos 
Banco 
Comercial 
Português 
Novo 
Banco 
Banco 
Português de 
Investimento 
Caixa 
Económica 
Montepio Geral 
Caixa Central 
Crédito 
Agrícola Mútuo 
Pillar 1 4,5% 4,5% 4,5% 4,5% 4,5% 4,5% 
Pillar 2* 2,25% 2,25% 2,5% 2,25% 3% 2,5% 
Buffer O-SII 0,5% 0,375% 0,25% 0,25% 0,125% 0% 
Buffer Count. 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 
Buffer Cons. 2,5% 2,5% 2,5% 2,5% 2,5% 2,5% 
CET1 Ratio 9,75% 9,625% 9,75% 9,50% 10,125% 9,5% 
Tier 1 Ratio 11,25% 11,125% 11,25% 11,00% 11,625% 11% 
Capital Ratio 13,25% 13,125% 13,25% 13,00% 13,625% 13% 
2020 increase 0,25% 0,188% 0,125% 0,125% 0,063% 0% 
2021 increase 0,25% 0,187% 0,125% 0,125% 0,062% 0% 
 
 
 Having defined the minimum capital requirements that Portuguese institutions must 
comply with in 2019, it is crucial to distinguish the main components of own funds before 
assessing their evolution throughout time (Graphs 1 and 2). According to the CRR, for regulatory 
purposes the total amount of eligible capital corresponds to the sum of Tier 1 and Tier 2 
instruments after deductions and adjustments, with the first being divided in either Common 
Equity Tier 1 (CET 1) and Additional Tier 1 (AT 1).  
 Also referred to as core capital, Common Equity Tier 1 is the main source of funding 
for institutions to cover their RWAs exposures and its two major constituents are common 
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shares and retained earnings. Apart from accounting for accumulated other comprehensive 
income and other reserves, several deductions such as those referent to intangible assets, benefit 
pension funds and deferred tax assets contingent to future profitability must be considered. 
Additional Tier 1 are capital instruments without a fix maturity which have seniority over CET 
1 but are subordinate to Tier 2. Noncumulative perpetual preferred stocks and certain 
Contingent Convertible hybrid instruments, also known as CoCos, can be considered under 
strict conditions as AT 1. To conclude, Tier 2 capital or supplementary capital is limited to 
100% of Tier 1 and is not as consistent as the former categories. Its major components are 
subordinated loans and several hybrid instruments which amongst other requirements may not 
be redeemable within 5 years of their issuance date.  
Graphs 1: Evolution Capital, RWAs and respective ratios of Large Portuguese Banks  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Graphs 2: Evolution Capital, RWAs and respective ratios of Small Portuguese Banks 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
Caixa Geral de Depósitos            Banco Comercial Português                   Novo Banco 
Banco Português de Investimento            Caixa Económica 
Montepio Geral 
Caixa Central Crédito 
Agrícola Mútuo 
RWAs Capital 
RWAs 
Capital 
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 From the graphs presented it is possible to grasp the evolution of Portuguese banks 
regulatory capital, RWAs and the resulting ratios from the second semester of 2015 to the first 
semester of 2018. In June 2018, all banks are in compliance with the capital requirements for 
the subsequent year, being on average 1,33 percentage points above the minimum capital ratio 
requisites, this is the ratio that institutions are closer to not complying with.  
 As observable, with an average of 90,8% CET 1 capital represents the majority of own 
funds, ranging from 84,1% to 99,2% of their total. Despite several banks in Portugal having 
recurred to CoCos to finance themselves during the financial crisis, only the €500M perpetual 
AT1 issuance from Caixa Geral de Depósitos in June 2017 at a rate of 10,75% is a regulatory 
eligible position. Opposite to the 1,4% from AT 1, Tier 2 comprises on average 7,8% of 
institutions own funds and the rate at which banks can finance themselves in respect to this tier 
is a comparable and foremost indicator of the perceived financial health by investors. 
Table 4: Most recent Tier 2 capital funding’s by Portuguese banks since 2017 
 
 
 
   
 
 
Annual Costs does not account for tax shield (Annual Cost = Amount * Rate) and Euribor was assumed to be 1% 
 Even though the outcomes presented on Graphs 1 and 2 follow each year’s regulatory 
framework, the CRR determined a phased-out period for certain unclassified items and a    
phased-in approach for capital deductions. Accordingly, the CET 1 values obtained were higher 
than those under a fully implemented methodology by 20,1% in 2015, 21,5% in 2016, 8,5% in 
2017 and 5,5% in 2018. If instead of phased-in the fully implemented approach was considered, 
the capital ratios would have been slightly lower than those attained, particularly in 2015 and 
2016. If accounted for this factor the overall deterioration of own funds until December 2016 
and the subsequent improvement from that date onwards would be even more preponderant.  
Bank Amount Rate Annual Cost Issuance Maturity 
Caixa Geral de Depósitos €500M 5,75% €28,75M 03/2018 03/2028 
Banco Comercial Português €300M 4,5% €13,50M 12/2017 12/2024 
Novo Banco €400M 8,5% €34,00M 06/2018 06/2028 
Banco Português de Investimento €300M Euribor 6m 
+ 5,74% 
€20,22M 03/2017 03/2027 
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Table 5: Phased-in Capital Ratio percentage points variation per semester from 2016 to June 2018 and average 
total variation of its Own Funds and RWAs (Annex 3 with Portuguese Banks) 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Over the period being considered the enhancements in Portuguese banks’ capital ratio 
was attained due to a significant decrease in RWAs in conjugation with a moderate growth of 
own funds by 3,6%. In respect to the mean values for their peers, whereas RWAs increased 
slightly in both clusters, the preeminent enhancement of own funds by 5,7% in Cluster Large 
and 11,1% in Cluster Small lead the capital ratio to surge over the last three years. 
Notwithstanding a lower own funds growth, the improvements on the capital ratio were on 
average higher in Portugal due to an outweigh of the denominator component. Additionally, 
either in Portuguese banks or abroad the enhancements were on average higher in smaller banks 
than in larger institutions. 
 When compared to the 130 banks from EBA’s transparency exercise, in June 2018 
Portuguese institution fell substantially behind in terms of capital adequacy. As a result of 
several outliers, the overall average capital ratio of 24,3% is reasonably disconnected from the 
median percentile of the industry (25th = 16,2%; 50th = 18,6%; 75th = 23,3%). The average 
Portuguese CET1 ratio of 13,2%, Tier 1 ratio of 13,6% and capital ratio of 14,5% correspond 
respectively to the 23rd, 17th and 11st percentiles. In this sense, whereas Portuguese institutions 
have a 0,2 percentage points difference from CET 1 to Tier 1 ratios and of 1,1 from Tier 1 ratio 
to the capital ratio, the values for the industry are correspondingly higher at 1,3 and 2,7. Thus, 
it is not only possible to infer lack of capital for Portuguese banks but also in terms of their 
diversification through the usage of AT 1 and Tier 2 capital instruments, particularly in smaller 
institutions. Notwithstanding the the slightly lower values, both conclusions still hold true if 
 Capital Ratio Own 
Funds RWAs Capital Ratio Variation 2016/06 2016/12 2017/06 2017/12 2018/06 Total 
Large Banks Portugal -1,16 -1,03 2,06 1,21 0,30 1,38 -2,9% -12,1% 
Cluster Large 0,25 0,36 0,08 0,24 0,07 0,93 5,7% 0,3% 
Small Banks Portugal 0,71 0,14 1,40 0,42 0,54 3,21 10,1% -14,3% 
Cluster Small 0,20 0,94 0,36 0,22 0,39 2,11 11,1% 1,8% 
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banks from the two clusters were used on the comparison analysis instead (CET 1 ratio of 
17,5%, Tier 1 ratio of 18,2% and capital ratio of 20,3%). 
 Given the capital increases that occurred in recent years it is not unconceivable to 
assume that equity holders would not be willing to raise further amounts of capital unless it 
becomes strictly necessary to do so in order to fulfil the minimum capital requirements. Having 
into consideration Portuguese banks’ proximity to the thresholds this is a scenario that should 
not be disregarded. Alternatively, if managers decide to raise capital through regulatory eligible 
debt that contrasts with equity where dividends may be non-existent during adverse situations, 
the cost of debt will have an annual negative impact on institutions income statement. 
Consequently, the increase in debt related expenses would diminish the ability of Portuguese 
banks to enhance own funds through retained earnings (Table 5). 
Graphs 3: Profitability of Portuguese Banks in respect to peers (x = Capital Ratio; y = Net Income / Own Funds) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
~Net Income: Annualized results from Jan 2017 to June 2018 
Capital Ratio & Own Funds from June 2018  
  
 From the graphs it is possible to infer that the profitability of Portuguese banks from 
Cluster Large is still unsatisfactory when compared to their peers, particularly in respect to 
Novo Banco whose negative results may force him to plea further amounts of capital from the 
resolution fund. In respect to Cluster Small, Caixa Económica Montepio Geral is the bank 
which may face higher probabilities of having to raise further amounts of capital due to its low 
profitability aligned with the non-existent margin of safety from the minimal requisites. Despite 
having been profitable concerns from lack of margin also apply to Banco Comercial Português. 
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 To conclude, before conducting the analysis of Risk Weighted Assets it is worth 
remarking that Portuguese banks comply with the minimum capital requirements of 3% for the 
leverage ratio, which relates Tier 1 capital to the sum of banks assets and off-balance sheet 
exposures. In June 2018 the leverage ratio in Portugal ranged from 6,6% to 8,8% and its mean 
value of 7,6% is in line with the average ratios from their peers. (Annex 3 with complete list)  
5. Risk Weighted Assets 
 The Risk Weighted Assets are the denominator component of the solvency ratio and 
therefore a preponderant factor when determining banks’ capital adequacy. In June 2018 
Portuguese banks reported a mean amount of €26 884M which corresponds to nearly 7 times 
the amount of own funds. Having remained relatively steady in the previous two semesters, 
RWAs declined on average 13,2% over the past three years, with Caixa Central de Crédito 
Agícola Mútuo being the only Portuguese institution contradicting the negative trend. Opposite 
to Portugal, with an equivalent proportion of increases and decreases banks from Cluster Large 
and Cluster Small attained a mean increment of 0,3% and 1,8% of their RWAs, respectively.  
Table 6: Distribution of RWAs across types of risk in June 2018 
 Credit Risk Market Risk Operational Risk Other Risks 
Caixa Geral de Depósitos  86,9% 3,6% 7,7% 1,8% 
Banco Comercial Português  86,7% 4,4% 8,6% 0,4% 
Novo Banco 88,1% 2,6% 4,6% 4,7% 
Cluster Large 88,0% 2,4% 7,9% 1,8% 
Banco Português de Investimento 84,4% 7,0% 8,5% 0,1% 
Caixa Económica Montepio Geral 87,8% 0,8% 6,4% 5,0% 
Caixa Central de Crédito Agrícola 86,7% 0,4% 12,3% 0,6% 
Cluster Small 86,5% 1,8% 9,3% 2,4%   
 
 Credit Risk is the preeminent component of RWAs and according to the evolution of 
the reminiscent types of risk, it was the catalyst for the Portuguese reductions to the capital ratio 
over the past 3 years. There is a significant alignment across Portuguese banks’ exposure to 
Credit Risk and the average weight of 86,8% is line with the mean value from both clusters. 
16 
 
When it comes to Market Risk, even though the exposures in Caixa Económica Montepio Geral 
and Caixa Central de Crédito Agrícola represent less than 1% of the total RWAs, the 
reminiscent Portuguese banks reported higher values than their peers’ means, particularly 
Banco Português de Investmento with 7,0%. Arising from adverse market movements in 
interest rates, foreign exchanges, equities and committees, this type of risk is approximately 
two and half times lower than the average of 8,0% from Operational Risk, which according to 
its definition arises from inadequate or failed internal processes, people and systems or from 
external events. Whereas Portuguese banks have an overweighed position in Market Risk, the 
exposure to Operational Risk is underweighted when compared to their peers. Opposite to what 
occurred in the previous two risk categories, the exposure to Operational Risk is on average 
higher in smaller banks than in larger institutions, both for Portugal and the industry. The values 
for Other risks possess a minor significance on institutions overall RWAs and except for Novo 
Banco and Caixa Económica Montepio Geral they are smaller in Portugal than abroad. 
5.1.  Credit Risk 
 According to the Capital Requirements Regulation banks may compute Credit Risk 
either recurring to the Standardise approach or the Internal Ratings Based approach, with the 
latter being divided in the Foundation IRB and Advanced IRB. The Standardised approach 
resorts to external credit ratings as a mean to allocate Risk Weights to exposures according to 
the level of risk associated with a position. Alternatively, the IRB approach requires the use of 
four parameters to determine the final risk exposure: Probability of Default (PD), Loss Given 
Default (LGD), Exposure at Default (EAD), and Maturity (M). Under the Foundation IRB 
banks obtain permission to determine the PD by themselves and must use regulator’s exogenous 
values for the remaining constituents. Contrary, the more flexible Advanced IRB refers to 
situations where institutions are given authorization by the competent authorities to develop 
their own internal models for the computation of the PD, LGD and EAD.  
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 From EBA’s consolidated exercise the dataset can be arranged to attain the Original 
Exposure, Exposure Value and Risk Exposure by class of risk, with the latter corresponding to 
the final RWAs from Credit Risk. In this sense, the Exposure Value refers to the Original 
Exposure of an asset after accounting the effects of credit conversion factors and credit risk 
mitigation techniques. The first refers to the prospect of banks off-balance sheet exposure being 
transferred to the balance sheet (Annex 4), the second to mitigation techniques such as funded 
and unfunded credit protections which diminish the risk associated with the position being 
collateralized or guaranteed. Due to limitations in the dataset only the multiplier from their 
aggregate impact can be attained and for simplicity reasons it was named “CCF” even though 
it accounts for both effects. Additionally, the multiplier which transforms the Exposure Value 
in the final Risk Exposure corresponds to the “Risk Weight”. As different assets have different 
probabilities of becoming an impairment, the RWs are expected to fluctuate according to the 
level of risk of a position and the regulatory approach followed for its reporting.  
 With the exception of Banco Comercial Português and Novo Banco which use the IRB 
approach for the treatment of 65% and 61% of their Exposure Value, the remaining Portuguese 
institutions rely fully on the Standardised methodology. In respect to their peers, 63% of banks 
from Cluster Large and 40% of those from Cluster Small resort to internal models, with 71% 
being the average exposure measured with this approach. Despite the RWs being on average 
lower, Portuguese banks fall short in terms of their usage, particularly smaller institutions. 
According to the paper from Sophia Döme and Stefan Kerbl, the country where a bank is 
headquartered also effects until some extent the RWs attained from internal models. 
 When it comes to the overall CCF multiplier, it ranged from 82,9% in Novo Banco to 
89% in Caixa Central de Crédito Agrícola and its average of 86,2% is half a percentage point 
lower than the mean value of the banks from both clusters. In this sense, if RWs were also in 
line Portuguese Banks would be on average required to hold the same amounts of capital than 
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their peers for each unit of Original Exposure detained. However, that does not occur since the 
mean RW of 52% in Portuguese Large Banks and of 48,5% in Portuguese Small Banks is 
respectively 10,6 and 9,8 percentage points higher than the values from both clusters. Over the 
past three years the Risk Exposure decreased on average 15,7% in Portuguese Banks, with its 
two components having reported an average reduction of 7,8% in respect to the Exposure Value 
and 4,7 percentage points in terms of the RW multiplier. The only exceptions were the increase 
of exposures in Caixa Central de Crédito Agrícola and the RW in Banco Comercial Português. 
 From Annex 6 and 7 it is possible to compare each individual institution with the values 
from their peers across regulatory classes, categories, different types of exposures and their 
respective multipliers, while differentiating between both the Standardised and IRB 
approaches. However, in order to provide a better sense of appraisal regulatory classes of Credit 
Risk were aggregated in four major categories.  
Table 7: Decomposition of Risk Exposure across four major categories of Credit Risk as a % of its total 
 
 
 
 
 
Governments = Central governments or central banks; Regional governments or local authorities; Public sector 
entities; Multilateral Development Banks; International Organisation 
 
Others = Exposures in default; Items associated with particularly high risk; Covered bonds; Claims on institutions 
and corporate with a short-term credit assessment; Claims in the form of CIU; Equity Exposures; Securitisations: 
Other items & Other not credit obligation assets 
  
 Apart from Caixa Geral de Depósitos, Portuguese banks have a relatively lower 
exposure to the class “Governments + Institutions” and with the exception of Novo Banco and 
Banco Português de Investimento they also need to allocate a lower portion of own funds to 
 
Governments 
+ Institutions 
Corporates 
 
Retail + Secured by 
Mortgages on IP 
Others 
 
Caixa Geral de Depósitos 16,6% 33,4% 33,5% 16,5% 
Banco Comercial Português 7,2% 39,7% 25,2% 27,9% 
Novo Banco 10,3% 45,9% 11,7% 32,0% 
Cluster Large 10,7% 45,0% 28,6% 15,8% 
Banco Português de Investimento 5,3% 42,3% 39,1% 13,3% 
Caixa Económica Montepio Geral 4,2% 21,4% 39,7% 34,8% 
Caixa Central de Crédito Agrícola  1,8% 25,4% 39,5% 33,2% 
Cluster Small 11,9% 38,7% 32,1% 17,3% 
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cover their positions to “Corporates”. In general terms, the opposite occurs in the remaining 
categories, “Retail + Secured by Mortgages on Immovable Property” and “Others”. 
 Intuitively, Portuguese banks may have a relatively higher RW by overrepresentation of 
their Exposure Value in categories which require a higher amount of capital and/or by having 
an enhanced RW across their classes of risk. Thus, on the following graphs banks are organized 
according to their RWs and Exposure Values for each category. To differentiate between both 
reporting methodologies, banks whose internal models were used on more than 25% of the 
Exposure Value of a given category are emphasized in light blue. Due to its relevancy, expected 
future changes on the current regulatory paradigm were also incorporated on the analysis. 
a.  Class Governments + Institutions 
 Graphs 4: Distribution of Portuguese Banks and respective peers (x-axis = % of total Exp. Value; y-axis RW) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 Having registered a low variability across Portuguese institutions, the major constituents 
of this category in terms of Exposure Value are the positions to central governments or central 
banks and to Institutions, which comprise on average 82% and 13% of its total. In relation to 
their peers, the mean values for these two classes are instead 61% and 26%. With an average 
of 99% in Portugal and 96,7% in the industry, the impact of the CCF multiplier is insignificant. 
 Despite being possible to resort to internal models, due to the lower incentives from 
doing so only 8 institutions and none from Portugal followed this approach on at least 25% of 
their exposures. According to the CRR, under the Standardised Approach the RWs may vary 
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between 0% and 150% depending on external credit ratings. Favourably, for exposures to a 
central government or central bank of a Member State a 0% RW is applicable and for unrated 
Institution it should be considered the rating of its nation central government instead. Not 
having yet been transposed to European legislation, Basel III: finalising post-crisis reforms 
introduces a different methodology for exposures to unrated banks which allocates different 
RWs according to banks compliance with the regulatory capital requirements. 
 The average RW of 13,7% for Portugal and 11,9% for its peers are significantly lower 
than the multipliers from the reminiscent categories. Thus, despite representing a considerably 
large portion of banks’ Exposure Value, after considering the effect from RWs its relevance 
diminishes (i.e. weights decrease from 28,8% to 7,56% in Portugal and from 32,5% to 11,3% 
for their peers). Analysing its evolution since December 2015, even though the Exposure Value 
increased in 4 out of the 6 Portuguese Banks, due to improvements on the RWs for the 
remaining banks only Caixa Geral de Depósitos and Novo Banco registered an increase on the 
Risk Exposure, which decreased on average 20,5%. In line with the values from Graphs 5 and 
Table 7, in June 2018 these two institutions are required to hold relatively higher amounts of 
capital to cover their positions and the opposite occurs to Caixa Central de Crédito Agrícola. 
b.  Corporates 
Graphs 5: Distribution of Portuguese Banks and respective peers (x-axis = % Exp. Value; y-axis RW) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
   
 The class Corporates refers to larger companies which do not conform with the 
requisites to be treated as retail. Even though under the Standardised Approach the RWs are 
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expected to fluctuate from 20% to 150%, the RW of 100% applicable to corporates without a 
rating comprises the vast majority of positions in this reporting methodology. Therefore, with 
the possibility of attaining a lower RW through the usage of internal models, there are now 38 
institutions which recur to this approach, including both Banco Comercial Português and Novo 
Banco. Despite being lower than the Standardised approach, their RWs’ would continue to be 
considered high if accessed solely with banks which use the IRB methodology. 
 The relatively higher RW for this category requires greater levels of own funds to be 
held for each unit of Exposure Value, thus enhancing its relevancy in terms Risk Exposure (i.e. 
weights increase from 20,7% to 34,7% in Portugal and from 23,8% to 41,8% for their peers). 
However, opposite to the previous category the effect from the CCF is now advantageous due 
to a multiplier of 75% both for Portugal and their peers. Since December 2015 the Risk 
Exposure for this category decreased on average 18,5% across Portuguese Banks, mostly due 
to a decrease of the subjacent exposure value by 17,4%. Having remained considerably steady 
for the institutions which used the Standardised approach, the RW multiplier for Banco 
Comercial Português and Novo Banco decreased respectively 3,5 and 1,6 percentage points.  
c.  Class Retail + Secured by Mortgages on Immovable Property 
Graphs 6: Distribution of Portuguese Banks and respective peers (x-axis = % Exp. Value; y-axis RW) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Note: IRB approach is only applicable for the Retail class 
  
 To be considered an exposure to Retail the position needs to be either referent to a 
natural person or a Small and medium-sized enterprise. Apart from not exceeding a cumulative 
22 
 
exposure of €1M, the enterprise must have less than 250 employees and an annual turnover 
inferior to €50M or an annual balance sheet inferior to €43M. Despite the RW multiplier of 
75% under the Standardised Approach, a factor of 0,7619 is applicable to further incentivize 
financial institutional lending to SMEs. When it comes to positions secured by Mortgages on 
Immovable Property they can either be referent to residential or commercial property. As the 
loans conceived under this class have a collateral associated to them, the respective RWs of 
35% and 50% result in relatively lower amounts of capital having to be held by institutions. 
Under the proposals for the CRR II the eligibility criteria for the SME factor will be extended 
and according to Basel III: Finalising post-crisis reforms a subtype of Retail will have a RW 
of 45% and PMEs which do not classify as Retail a lower multiplier of 85% instead. In respect 
to Exposures to Mortgages on Immovable Property the same Basel document introduces a new 
methodology which granulates the RWs according to a Loan to Value ratio approach. 
 In respect to the decomposition of this major category, the relevance of the class Retail 
is significantly higher for banks which resorted to internal models for the treatment of their 
positions. In this sense, whereas Retail represents in Banco Comercial Português and Novo 
Banco 97% and 83% of the total Exposure Value of this category, on the reminiscent Portuguese 
banks it only accounts on average for 28%. When it comes to the CCF its effect diverged 
between both classes. Whereas for Positions Secured by Immovable Property the multiplier 
registered low variability and was almost inexistent around the average of 96,9%, for the class 
Retail it attained a meaningful value of 74,6% in Portugal and 82,1% abroad. With the exception 
of Novo Banco, the remaining Portuguese Institutions have a higher Exposure Value to this 
aggregate category than their peers average of 35,1%. Since banks which rely on internal 
models attained lower RWs, if instead banks were compared according to the same reporting 
methodology, despite having register a higher RW the results would be more favourable for 
Portuguese Institutions under the Standardised approach. 
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  As the average RW for this category is generally lower than the overall RWs the 
importance of this category decreases from the Exposure Value to the Risk Exposure (i.e. 
weights decrease from 40,5% to 31,4% in Portugal and from 35,1% to 30,4% for their peers). 
Since 2015 the RWs decreased on average 1,2 percentage points with all bank except Banco 
Comercial Português attaining an improvement. In terms of Exposure Value only Banco 
Português de Investimento and Caixa Económica Montepio Geral contradicted the negative. 
Despite the Risk Exposure having decreased on average 2,2% for this category, opposite to the 
reminiscent banks the three mentioned institutions reported an increase.  
d.  Others  
 The category Others encompasses the reminiscent classes not yet covered and compared 
with the formers possesses the highest RWs due to the enhanced level of risk associated with 
its constituents. Opposite to the RWs which are on average higher in Portugal, the CCF 
multiplier of 73% is 12,3 percentage points lower than the mean value from both clusters. 
However, with the exception of Banco Português de Investimento, Portuguese banks report a 
significantly higher Risk Exposure than their peers to this comprehensive category. In respect 
to the CCF effect from December 2015 to June 2018 the implied RW only declined in Caixa 
Geral de Depósitos and Caixa Econonómica Montepio Geral, as the Exposure Value diminished 
expressively across all Portuguese Institutions the average Risk Exposure declined on average 
by 17,6%, with the latter being the only bank contradicting the trend. (Annex 7 with the respective 
graphs for category Others and Annex 8 with summary of Credit Risk results)  
 
Table 8: Risk Exposure of category Others by regulatory classes as a % of total Risk Exposure from Credit Risk 
 
Combined classes: Items associated with particularly high risk; Covered bonds; Claims on institutions and 
corporate with a short-term credit assessment; Claims in the form of CIU 
 
Exposures    
in Default 
Equity 
Exposures 
Combined 
classes * 
Other items & Other non 
credit-obligation assets 
∑ 
Large Banks Portugal 4,6% 4,6% 3,5% 12,8% 25,5% 
Cluster Large 4,8% 4,5% 2,1% 4,3% 15,8% 
Small Banks Portugal 8,8% 2,8% 2,9% 12,6% 27,1% 
Cluster Small 4,2% 4,3% 3,1% 5,7% 17,3% 
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6. Conclusions and Recommendations 
 The foremost objective of the study conducted was to accomplish an comprehensive 
analysis of Portuguese Banks capital adequacy for June 2018 and their respective evolution 
while accessing the results attained with their peers from the industry. Even though due to its 
relevance on establishing institutions’ own funds the approach for clustering relied exclusively 
on banks RWAs, further variables could have been incorporated on the procedure (e.g. Loans 
to Deposit ratio, Return on Assets, Returns on Equity, Net Interest Margin, Profit Margins). 
 The progressions of the Basel Accords represented not only an enhancement of capital 
requirements but also an increasingly complexity of its processes and methodologies. In this 
sense, it is of most importance that institutions enforce and develop proactive mechanisms to 
identify and measure the operational and financial costs of new regulatory initiatives prior to 
its implementation. Since legislators still need to transpose to European Law several of the 
recent reforms from Basel III, forthcoming alterations to the CRR and CRD IV are expected. 
 Having assumed the requisites from Pillar 2 to remain constant, in June 2018 all 
Portuguese Institutions were in compliance with the capital requirements for the subsequent 
year, being on average 1,33% above their minimum capital ratio. When compared to their peers 
the regulatory capital held to absorb the impact of unexpected losses and secure solvency during 
periods of distress is still considerably lower. With CET 1 capital ranging from 84,1% to 99,2% 
of institutions own funds and comprising on average 90,8% of its total, Portuguese banks but 
particularly smaller institutions fell behind in terms of the diversification of funding’s through 
the usage of AT 1 and Tier 2 capital instruments. Over the past three years the enhancements 
to the capital ratio were in percentages points higher in Portugal than abroad and smaller 
institutions attained on average higher improvements. However, whereas the driver for both 
clusters was a preeminent increase in own funds by 8,4%, in Portugal the major catalyst was an 
expressive decline in RWAs by 13,2%. 
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 Corresponding only to 3,1% and 8,0% of total RWAs, Market Risk and Operational 
Risk were not further incorporated on the analysis due to their diminished size and lack of 
contribution for the observable decrease in RWAs. In contrast, having registered low variability 
across the average of 86,8%, Credit Risk is the major component of banks RWAs. Over the 
past three years the Risk Exposure of Portuguese Banks decreased on average 15,7% due to 
both a reduction of the Exposure Value by 7,8% and a decline on the overall RWs by 4,7 
percentage points. However, in contrast with the relatively close value for the CCF multiplier, 
the RW of 50,2% in Portugal is still 10,2 percentage points higher than the averages from both 
clusters. Breaking down the analysis it was possible to access a relatively lower Risk Exposure 
to Institutions and Corporates and significative higher RWAs for the category Others. With a 
relevance in terms of Risk Exposure in line with its peers, Retail + Secured by Mortgages on 
Immovable Property was the only category where Portuguese Banks attained a lower RW than 
their peers. Additionally, even though on average the IRB approach encompassed a lower RW, 
with the exception of Banco Comercial Português and Novo Banco the remaining institutions 
rely fully on the Standardised Approach for the treatment of their exposures. 
  To conclude, three Portuguese institutions were identified as more prone to face capital 
adequacy constraints. Novo Banco was selected due to a prevailing negative net income, Banco 
Comercial Português because its margin of safety from the minimal capital requirements is 
insufficient to meet the enhancements to the O-SII buffer and Caixa Económica Montepio Geral 
due to its low profitability and inexistent margin. Either through an increase in own funds or a 
decrease in RWAs (e.g. reduction or transference of exposures to classes with lower RWs such 
as Governments and Institutions, securitisation of positions, incentivize credit risk mitigations 
techniques, shift to internal models), as a final remark it is advised for Portuguese institutions 
to endure further improvements to the Capital Ratio and attain a at least a 2,5% to 5% margin 
of safety to further diminish regulatory constraints during unfavourable market conditions. 
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8. Annexes 
 
Annex 1: RWAs of banks from Cluster Large and Cluster Small 
 
Large Banks RWAs  Small Banks RWAs 
Caixa Geral de Depósitos SA 49 872  Banco Português de Investimento 16 882 
Banco Comercial Português SA 41 793  Caixa Económica Montepio Geral, SA 11 259 
Novo Banco, SA 32 287  Caixa Central Crédito Agrícola Mútuo 8 909 
Raiffeisenbankengruppe OÖ Verbund 25 445  Arion banki hf 6 450 
Abanca Holding Financiero, S.A. 26 489  Íslandsbanki hf. 6 639 
OTP Bank Nyrt. 27 594  Landsbankinn 7 711 
Bank Polska Kasa Opieki SA 27 816  Sydbank 7 746 
Erwerbsgesellschaft S-Finanzgruppe  28 472  Sberbank Europe AG 8 304 
HASPA Finanzholding AG 28 803  Investar 8 531 
Kutxabank, S.A. 29 411  Nova Ljubljanska Banka D,D. 8 693 
BPER Banca S.p.A. 31 130  Volksholding B.V. 9 452 
RCI banque  31 571  Banca Transilvania 9 526 
Bankinter, S.A. 32 474  Sparebank 1 SMN 10 213 
DEXIA SA 32 749  Aareal Bank AG 10 615 
National Bank of Greece, S.A. 36 054  Precision Capital S.A. 10 681 
Nationwide Building Society 36 600  N.V. Bank Nederlandse Gemeenten 12 152 
Eurobank Ergasias, S.A. 37 795  Deutsche Apotheker- und Ärztebank 12 492 
Citibank Holdings Ireland Limited 39 678  Iccrea Banca Spa 12 674 
Swedbank – group 41 565  Credito Emiliano Holding SpA 13 240 
NRW.Bank 45 516  SR-bank   13 334 
Bank of Ireland Group plc 45 760  Volksbanken Verbund 13 395 
Norddeutsche Landesbank Girozentrale 45 773  Deutsche Pfandbriefbank AG 13 744 
Nykredit Realkredit 46 658  Banca Carige SpA 14 976 
PKO Bank Polski SA 47 162  Landwirtschaftliche Rentenbank 15 198 
Mediobanca SpA 47 363  Banque et Caisse d'Epargne de l'Etat 16 922 
Alpha Bank AE 48 079  Bank of Cyprus Holdings PLC 17 189 
Piraeus Bank SA 48 808  Liberbank, S.A. 17 254 
OP Financial group 51 003 
 Landeskreditbank Baden-Württemberg–
Förderbank 19 092 
Belfius Banque SA 51 218  BAWAG Group AG 20 271 
Landesbank Hessen-Thüringen  51 881  Ibercaja Banco, S.A. 22 156 
AIB Group plc 52 015  Banca Popolare di Sondrio 22 208 
Svenska Handelsbanken – group 52 976  Banco de Crédito Social Cooperativo 23 424 
Unione di Banche Italiane SpA 60 176  Unicaja Banco, S.A. 23 878 
Large Banks Portugal 41 317  Small Banks Portugal 12 350 
Cluster Large 40 268  Cluster Small 13 605 
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Annex 2: Institutions Leverage Ratio in June 2018 
 Ratio   Ratio 
Caixa Geral de Depósitos 7,9%  Banco Português de Investimento 6,7% 
Banco Comercial Português 7,4%  Caixa Económica Montepio Geral 7,8% 
Novo Banco 8,8%  Caixa Central Crédito Agrícola Mútuo 7,1% 
Large Banks Portugal 8,0%  Small Banks Portugal 7,2% 
Cluster Large 7,7%  Cluster Small 7,2% 
 
 
Annex 3: Phased-in Capital Ratio percentage points variation per semester from 2016 to June 
2018 and average total variation of its Own Funds and RWAs 
 
 
 
Annex 4: Classification of off-balance sheet exposures according to the applicable CCF 
Note: For on balance sheet exposures this CCF is 100% 
Source: Capital Requirements Regulation No. 575/2013  
 
Full risk 
(100%) 
(a) guarantees having the character of credit substitutes, (e.g. guarantees for the good payment of credit 
facilities); 
(b) credit derivatives; 
(c) acceptances; 
(d) endorsements on bills not bearing the name of another institution 
(e) transactions with recourse (e.g. factoring, invoice discount facilities); 
(f) irrevocable standby letters of credit having the character of credit substitutes; 
(g) assets purchased under outright forward purchase agreements; 
(h) forward deposits 
(i) the unpaid portion of partly-paid shares and securities; 
(j) asset sale and repurchase agreements as referred to in Article 12(3) and (5) of Directive 
86/635/EEC; 
(k) ) other items also carrying full risk. 
Medium risk 
(50%) 
 
(a) trade finance off-balance sheet items, namely documentary credits issued or confirmed (see also 
'Medium/low risk'); 
(b) other off-balance sheet items: 
i) shipping guarantees, customs and tax bonds; 
ii) undrawn credit facilities (agreements to lend, purchase securities, provide guarantees or 
acceptance facilities) with an original maturity of more than one year;  
iii)  note issuance facilities (NIFs) and revolving underwriting facilities (RUFs); 
iv) other items also carrying medium risk and as communicated to EBA. 3. 
Medium/Low 
risk  
(a) trade finance off-balance sheet items:  
i) documentary credits in which underlying shipment acts as collateral and other self-
liquidating transactions;  
 Capital Ratio Own 
Funds RWAs Capital Ratio Variation 2016/06 2016/12 2017/06 2017/12 2018/06 Total 
Caixa Geral de Depósitos -1,07 -3,16 6,56 0,98 0,57 3,89 8,9% -17,3% 
B. Comercial Português -0,97 0,06 0,61 0,73 -1,41 -0,98 -10,1% -3,5% 
Novo Banco -1,44 0,02 -0,99 1,91 1,74 1,23 -7,7% -15,4% 
Cluster Large 0,25 0,36 0,08 0,24 0,07 0,93 5,7% 0,3% 
Banco P. de Investimento  0,14 0,42 1,90 1,26 -0,02 3,70 -4,5% -28,8% 
C. E. Montepio Geral 1,20 -0,09 2,09 0,37 0,32 3,88 12,8% -19,4% 
C. C. Crédito Agrícola  0,79 0,09 0,21 -0,36 1,31 2,05 22,0% 5,1% 
Cluster Small 0,20 0,94 0,36 0,22 0,39 2,11 11,1% 1,8% 
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(25%) ii) warranties (including tender and performance bonds and associated advance payment and 
retention guarantees) and guarantees not having the character of credit substitutes; 
iii) irrevocable standby letters of credit not having the character of credit substitutes;  
(b) other off-balance sheet items:  
i) undrawn credit facilities which comprise agreements to lend, purchase securities, provide 
guarantees or acceptance facilities with an original maturity of up to and including one year 
which may not be cancelled unconditionally at any time without notice or that do not 
effectively provide for automatic cancellation due to deterioration in a borrower's 
creditworthiness;  
ii) other items also carrying medium/low risk and as communicated to EBA. 27.6.2013 Official 
Journal of the European Union L 176/295 EN 4.  
Low risk 
(0%) 
(a) undrawn credit facilities comprising agreements to lend, purchase securities, provide guarantees or 
acceptance facilities which may be cancelled unconditionally at any time without notice, or that do 
effectively provide for automatic cancellation due to deterioration in a borrower's creditworthiness. 
Retail credit lines may be considered as unconditionally cancellable if the terms permit the 
institution to cancel them to the full extent allowable under consumer protection and related 
legislation;  
(b) undrawn credit facilities for tender and performance guarantees which may be cancelled 
unconditionally at any time without notice, or that do effectively provide for automatic cancellation 
due to deterioration in a borrower's creditworthiness; and  
(c) other items also carrying low risk and as communicated to EBA. 
 
 
 
 
Annex 5: Credit Risk distribution per class of risk in June 2018 
Notes: Data was retrieved from EBA’s transparency exercise and the values correspond to the averages from the 
banks within each set. With the purpose of not skewing the values for distribution of exposures across the four 
classes and for both multipliers, their computation originated from the average ratios of banks and not from the 
average value of their exposures. As mentioned, the CCF multiplier also accounts for the effect of mitigation. 
 
 
Large Banks Portugal 
Original Exposure Exposure Value Risk Exposure  
STD IRB Total STD IRB Total STD IRB Total CCF RW 
Central governments or 
central banks 15473 0 15473 15843 0 15843 2344 0 2344 103% 12% 
Regional governments or 
local authorities 796 0 796 750 0 750 164 0 164 92% 21% 
Public sector entities 334 0 334 207 0 207 227 0 227 60% 121% 
Multilateral Development 
Banks 22 0 22 74 0 74 0 0 0 268% 0% 
International Organisations 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0   
Institutions 2348 935 3283 2011 691 2702 580 829 1409 81% 54% 
Corporates 11286 11700 22986 7328 9653 16981 7232 6316 13548 74% 81% 
Retail 5286 13581 18866 3183 12883 16066 2106 2830 4936 80% 37% 
Secured by mortgages on 
immovable property 10735 0 10735 10605 0 10605 3950 0 3950 96% 49% 
Exposures in default 3722 0 3722 1548 0 1548 1684 0 1684 42% 111% 
Items associated with 
particularly high risk 279 0 279 261 0 261 392 0 392 93% 150% 
Covered bonds 12 0 12 12 0 12 2 0 2 99% 18% 
Claims on institutions and 
corporate with a short-term 
credit assessment 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0   
Claims in the form of CIU 570 0 570 453 0 453 473 0 473 88% 137% 
Equity exposures 129 668 797 121 643 764 131 1463 1594 95% 191% 
Other items 782 0 782 627 0 627 391 3596 3987 80% 62% 
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Securitisation 5 1334 1339 5 1240 1245 3 358 361 97% 43% 
TOTAL 51777 28217 79994 43028 25110 68138 19679 15392 35070 85% 52% 
a.  Gov + Institutions   25%   29%   11% 98% 20% 
b.  Corporates   31%   27%   40% 74% 81% 
c.  Retail + Sec Mort on IP   36%   38%   23% 90% 31% 
d.  Others   9%   7%   25% 68% 203% 
Cluster Large 
Original Exposure Exposure Value Risk Exposure  
STD IRB Total STD IRB Total STD IRB Total CCF RW 
Central governments or 
central banks 11300 6800 18100 12041 7247 19288 1162 550 1713 111% 11% 
Regional governments or 
local authorities 3709 0 3709 3799 0 3799 168 0 168 92% 17% 
Public sector entities 1422 0 1422 1174 0 1174 162 0 162 73% 36% 
Multilateral Development 
Banks 259 0 259 271 0 271 1 0 1 102% 1% 
International Organisations 664 0 664 663 0 663 0 0 0 96% 0% 
Institutions 6560 6382 12942 4493 6205 10698 964 717 1681 77% 23% 
Corporates 10413 25964 36377 7300 21034 28334 6790 9091 15881 78% 71% 
Retail 6046 29747 35793 4186 28902 33088 3004 3885 6890 81% 45% 
Secured by mortgages on 
immovable property 6516 0 6516 6345 0 6345 2888 0 2888 97% 44% 
Exposures in default 3222 0 3222 1737 0 1737 1908 0 1908 54% 119% 
Items associated with 
particularly high risk 167 0 167 133 0 133 200 0 200 86% 150% 
Covered bonds 306 0 306 306 0 306 41 0 41 100% 15% 
Claims on institutions and 
corporate with a short-term 
credit assessment 205 0 205 160 0 160 106 0 106 69% 70% 
Claims in the form of CIU 125 0 125 124 0 124 114 0 114 99% 115% 
Equity exposures 685 134 819 683 134 817 1261 345 1607 100% 177% 
Other items 1861 0 1861 1804 0 1804 1222 221 1443 98% 170% 
Securitisation 218 1648 1866 205 1586 1791 101 191 293 82% 111% 
TOTAL 53676 70676 124352 45423 65109 110532 20092 15002 35095 87% 41% 
a.  Gov + Institutions   29%   31%   11% 97% 14% 
b.  Corporates   29%   26%   45% 78% 71% 
c.  Retail + Sec Mort on IP   33%   34%   29% 88% 41% 
d.  Others   9%   8%   16% 85% 96% 
Small Banks Portugal 
Original Exposure Exposure Value Risk Exposure  
STD IRB Total STD IRB Total STD IRB Total CCF RW 
Central governments or 
central banks 5179 0 5179 5257 0 5257 65 0 65 101% 10% 
Regional governments or 
local authorities 523 0 523 413 0 413 83 0 83 98% 21% 
Public sector entities 76 0 76 74 0 74 74 0 74 85% 100% 
Multilateral Development 
Banks 21 0 21 53 0 53 0 0 0 98% 0% 
International Organisations 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0   
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Institutions 691 0 691 680 0 680 229 0 229 107% 24% 
Corporates 4681 0 4681 3556 0 3556 3487 0 3487 78% 98% 
Retail 3729 0 3729 2694 0 2694 1692 0 1692 69% 63% 
Secured by mortgages on 
immovable property 7311 0 7311 7128 0 7128 2601 0 2601 98% 36% 
Exposures in default 1415 0 1415 806 0 806 886 0 886 48% 111% 
Items associated with 
particularly high risk 80 0 80 80 0 80 120 0 120 97% 150% 
Covered bonds 1 0 1 1 0 1 0 0 0 100% 20% 
Claims on institutions and 
corporate with a short-term 
credit assessment 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0   
Claims in the form of CIU 172 0 172 172 0 172 172 0 172 92% 100% 
Equity exposures 173 0 173 173 0 173 316 0 316 98% 141% 
Other items 1654 0 1654 1348 0 1348 1181 0 1181 79% 78% 
Securitisation* 1 0 1 1 0 1 1 0 1 100% 59% 
TOTAL 25709 0 25709 22436 0 22436 10906 0 10906 87% 48% 
a.  Gov + Institutions   26%   29%   4% 100% 7% 
b.  Corporates   17%   15%   30% 79% 98% 
c.  Retail + Sec Mort on IP   42%   43%   39% 89% 44% 
d.  Others   16%   13%   27% 78% 106% 
Cluster Small 
Original Exposure Exposure Value Risk Exposure  
STD IRB Total STD IRB Total STD IRB Total CCF RW 
Central governments or 
central banks 5211 1224 6435 7064 1318 8383 184 111 294 116% 5% 
Regional governments or 
local authorities 2566 0 2566 2827 0 2827 30 0 30 127% 12% 
Public sector entities 1309 0 1309 1110 0 1110 57 0 57 76% 39% 
Multilateral Development 
Banks 235 0 235 242 0 242 0 0 0 130% 1% 
International Organisations 62 0 62 62 0 62 0 0 0 100% 0% 
Institutions 4923 1161 6084 3178 1101 4279 835 249 1085 79% 27% 
Corporates 6374 4393 10767 2986 3762 6748 2807 1471 4278 73% 80% 
Retail 2926 6531 9457 1991 6436 8427 1353 1047 2400 83% 52% 
Secured by mortgages on 
immovable property 3949 0 3949 3869 0 3869 1434 0 1434 91% 46% 
Exposures in default 1194 0 1194 565 0 565 622 0 622 57% 115% 
Items associated with 
particularly high risk 232 0 232 123 0 123 185 0 185 81% 150% 
Covered bonds 675 0 675 675 0 675 74 0 74 100% 11% 
Claims on institutions and 
corporate with a short-term 
credit assessment 17 0 17 17 0 17 6 0 6 76% 27% 
Claims in the form of CIU 89 0 89 82 0 82 67 0 67 92% 81% 
Equity exposures 229 61 290 226 61 287 333 215 548 99% 183% 
Other items 1584 0 1584 1462 0 1462 781 51 832 100% 70% 
Securitisation 216 62 279 192 62 255 60 7 67 88% 42% 
TOTAL 31793 13432 45225 26670 12741 39411 8827 3152 11978 87% 39% 
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Annex 6: Credit Risk distribution per class of risk for Portuguese Banks in June 2018 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
a.  Gov + Institutions   30%   34%   12% 97% 10% 
b.  Corporates   26%   22%   39% 73% 80% 
c.  Retail + Sec Mort on IP   34%   36%   32% 86% 40% 
d.  Others   10%   9%   17% 85% 114% 
Caixa Geral de 
Depósitos 
Original Exposure Exposure Value Risk Exposure  
STD IRB Total STD IRB Total STD IRB Total CCF RW 
Central governments or 
central banks 22517 0 22517 22600 0 22600 5290 0 5290 100% 23% 
Regional governments or 
local authorities 1435 0 1435 1484 0 1484 340 0 340 103% 23% 
Public sector entities 788 0 788 500 0 500 510 0 510 63% 102% 
Multilateral Development 
Banks 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0   
International Organisations 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0   
Institutions 3750 0 3750 3651 0 3651 1053 0 1053 97% 29% 
Corporates 20973 0 20973 14510 0 14510 14476 0 14476 69% 100% 
Retail 11496 0 11496 6595 0 6595 4247 0 4247 57% 64% 
Secured by mortgages on 
immovable property 29229 0 29229 29002 0 29002 10289 0 10289 99% 35% 
Exposures in default 7378 0 7378 3225 0 3225 3454 0 3454 44% 107% 
Items associated with 
particularly high risk 643 0 643 604 0 604 907 0 907 94% 150% 
Covered bonds 35 0 35 35 0 35 6 0 6 99% 18% 
Claims on institutions and 
corporate with a short-term 
credit assessment 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0   
Claims in the form of CIU 1592 0 1592 1256 0 1256 1256 0 1256 79% 100% 
Equity exposures 365 0 365 340 0 340 340 0 340 93% 100% 
Other items 2346 0 2346 1881 0 1881 1174 0 1174 80% 62% 
Securitisation 15 0 15 15 0 15 9 0 9 100% 57% 
TOTAL 102563 0 102563 85698 0 85698 43349 0 43349 84% 51% 
a.  Gov + Institutions   28%   33%   17% 99% 25% 
b.  Corporates   20%   17%   33% 69% 100% 
c.  Retail + Sec Mort on IP   40%   42%   34% 87% 41% 
d.  Others   12%   9%   16% 59% 97% 
Banco Comercial 
Português 
Original Exposure Exposure Value Risk Exposure  
STD IRB Total STD IRB Total STD IRB Total CCF RW 
Central governments or 
central banks 13586 0 13586 14103 0 14103 1732 0 1732 104% 12% 
Regional governments or 
local authorities 833 0 833 654 0 654 131 0 131 78% 20% 
Public sector entities 213 0 213 121 0 121 171 0 171 57% 141% 
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Multilateral Development 
Banks 18 0 18 18 0 18 0 0 0 100% 0% 
International Organisations 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0   
Institutions 2686 0 2686 1939 0 1939 560 0 560 72% 29% 
Corporates 8029 17328 25357 4654 14998 19652 4483 9902 14385 77% 73% 
Retail 2750 29629 32380 2371 27949 30320 1675 6913 8589 94% 28% 
Secured by mortgages on 
immovable property 966 0 966 902 0 902 536 0 536 93% 59% 
Exposures in default 807 0 807 387 0 387 438 0 438 48% 113% 
Items associated with 
particularly high risk 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0   
Covered bonds 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0   
Claims on institutions and 
corporate with a short-term 
credit assessment 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0   
Claims in the form of CIU 23 0 23 23 0 23 34 0 34 100% 150% 
Equity exposures 22 1702 1724 22 1643 1665 53 3680 3733 97% 224% 
Other items 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 5593 5593   
Securitisation 0 2726 2726 0 2446 2446 0 314 314 90% 13% 
TOTAL 29934 51385 81320 25194 47036 72230 9813 26402 36214 89% 50% 
a.  Gov + Institutions   21%   23%   7% 97% 15% 
b.  Corporates   31%   27%   40% 77% 73% 
c.  Retail + Sec Mort on IP   41%   43%   25% 94% 29% 
d.  Others   6%   6%   28% 86% 224% 
Novo Banco 
Original Exposure Exposure Value Risk Exposure  
STD IRB Total STD IRB Total STD IRB Total CCF RW 
Central governments or 
central banks 10317 0 10317 10825 0 10825 12 0 12 105% 0% 
Regional governments or 
local authorities 119 0 119 111 0 111 22 0 22 94% 20% 
Public sector entities 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0   
Multilateral Development 
Banks 47 0 47 203 0 203 0 0 0 436% 0% 
International Organisations 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0   
Institutions 609 2804 3413 443 2072 2516 126 2487 2613 74% 104% 
Corporates 4854 17772 22626 2821 13961 16782 2736 9046 11783 74% 70% 
Retail 1610 11113 12723 583 10701 11284 396 1577 1973 89% 17% 
Secured by mortgages on 
immovable property 2009 0 2009 1913 0 1913 1024 0 1024 95% 54% 
Exposures in default 2981 0 2981 1033 0 1033 1158 0 1158 35% 112% 
Items associated with 
particularly high risk 195 0 195 179 0 179 269 0 269 92% 150% 
Covered bonds 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0   
Claims on institutions and 
corporate with a short-term 
credit assessment 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0   
Claims in the form of CIU 95 0 95 82 0 82 130 0 130 86% 160% 
Equity exposures 0 303 303 0 286 286 0 708 708 94% 248% 
Other items 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 5194 5194   
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* Data from Securitisation positions in Banco Português de Investimento was not possible to be retrieved from the 
Market Discipline Report of June 2018. Therefore, it was assumed to be 0. 
 
 
 
Securitisation 0 1274 1274 0 1274 1274 0 760 760 100% 60% 
TOTAL 22835 33266 56101 18192 28294 46487 5875 19773 25648 83% 55% 
a.  Gov + Institutions   25%   29%   10% 98% 19% 
b.  Corporates   40%   36%   46% 74% 70% 
c.  Retail + Sec Mort on IP   26%   28%   12% 90% 23% 
d.  Others   9%   6%   32% 59% 288% 
Banco Português de 
Investimento 
Original Exposure Exposure Value Risk Exposure  
STD IRB Total STD IRB Total STD IRB Total CCF RW 
Central governments or 
central banks 6245 0 6245 6459 0 6459 9 0 9 101% 24% 
Regional governments or 
local authorities 1085 0 1085 775 0 775 155 0 155 103% 23% 
Public sector entities 121 0 121 119 0 119 118 0 118 63% 102% 
Multilateral Development 
Banks 63 0 63 157 0 157 1 0 1   
International Organisations 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0   
Institutions 1345 0 1345 1310 0 1310 516 0 516 98% 28% 
Corporates 8944 0 8944 6502 0 6502 6387 0 6387 69% 100% 
Retail 4688 0 4688 3102 0 3102 2010 0 2010 57% 64% 
Secured by mortgages on 
immovable property 11092 0 11092 10896 0 10896 3897 0 3897 99% 35% 
Exposures in default 728 0 728 648 0 648 668 0 668 44% 107% 
Items associated with 
particularly high risk 59 0 59 59 0 59 88 0 88 93% 150% 
Covered bonds 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 99% 19% 
Claims on institutions and 
corporate with a short-term 
credit assessment 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0   
Claims in the form of CIU 88 0 88 88 0 88 88 0 88 78% 100% 
Equity exposures 244 0 244 244 0 244 525 0 525 93% 100% 
Other items 671 0 671 671 0 671 647 0 647 80% 62% 
Securitisation* 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 100% 57% 
TOTAL 35373 0 35373 31029 0,00 31029 15108 0 15108 88% 49% 
a.  Gov + Institutions   25%   28%   5% 100% 9% 
b.  Corporates   25%   21%   42% 73% 98% 
c.  Retail + Sec Mort on IP   45%   45%   39% 89% 42% 
d.  Others   5%   6%   13% 95% 118% 
Caixa Económica 
Montepio Geral 
Original Exposure Exposure Value Risk Exposure  
STD IRB Total STD IRB Total STD IRB Total CCF RW 
Central governments or 
central banks 3159 0 3159 3185 0 3185 180 0 180 101% 6% 
Regional governments or 
local authorities 38 0 38 36 0 36 7 0 7 95% 20% 
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Public sector entities 71 0 71 71 0 71 71 0 71 100% 100% 
Multilateral Development 
Banks 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0   
International Organisations 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0   
Institutions 660 0 660 645 0 645 154 0 154 98% 24% 
Corporates 2794 0 2794 2149 0 2149 2111 0 2111 77% 98% 
Retail 2635 0 2635 1796 0 1796 1122 0 1122 68% 62% 
Secured by mortgages on 
immovable property 7666 0 7666 7353 0 7353 2799 0 2799 96% 38% 
Exposures in default 2290 0 2290 1161 0 1161 1291 0 1291 51% 111% 
Items associated with 
particularly high risk 162 0 162 162 0 162 243 0 243 100% 150% 
Covered bonds 2 0 2 2 0 2 0 0 0 100% 20% 
Claims on institutions and 
corporate with a short-term 
credit assessment 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0   
Claims in the form of CIU 305 0 305 305 0 305 305 0 305 100% 100% 
Equity exposures 158 0 158 158 0 158 158 0 158 100% 100% 
Other items 2046 0 2046 1668 0 1668 1441 0 1441 82% 86% 
Securitisation 4 0 4 4 0 4 2 0 2 100% 60% 
TOTAL 21990 0 21990 18695 0 18695 9883 0 9883 85% 53% 
a.  Gov + Institutions   18%   21%   4% 100% 10% 
b.  Corporates   13%   11%   21% 77% 98% 
c.  Retail + Sec Mort on IP   47%   49%   40% 89% 43% 
d.  Others   23%   19%   35% 70% 99% 
Caixa Central de 
Crédito Agrícula 
Original Exposure Exposure Value Risk Exposure  
STD IRB Total STD IRB Total STD IRB Total CCF RW 
Central governments or 
central banks 6132 0 6132 6128 0 6128 6 0 6 100% 0% 
Regional governments or 
local authorities 446 0 446 430 0 430 86 0 86 96% 20% 
Public sector entities 37 0 37 34 0 34 33 0 33 91% 99% 
Multilateral Development 
Banks 1 0 1 1 0 1 0 0 0 98% 0% 
International Organisations 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0   
Institutions 68 0 68 84 0 84 17 0 17 124% 21% 
Corporates 2306 0 2306 2016 0 2016 1962 0 1962 87% 97% 
Retail 3865 0 3865 3185 0 3185 1946 0 1946 82% 61% 
Secured by mortgages on 
immovable property 3176 0 3176 3135 0 3135 1107 0 1107 99% 35% 
Exposures in default 1227 0 1227 610 0 610 700 0 700 50% 115% 
Items associated with 
particularly high risk 19 0 19 19 0 19 28 0 28 99% 150% 
Covered bonds 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0   
Claims on institutions and 
corporate with a short-term 
credit assessment 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0   
Claims in the form of CIU 125 0 125 123 0 123 123 0 123 98% 100% 
Equity exposures 117 0 117 117 0 117 264 0 264 100% 224% 
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Annex 7: Distribution of Portuguese Banks and respective peers for the category Others       
(x-axis = % Exp. Value; y-axis RW) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Annex 8: Decomposition of exposures and the respective multipliers for Credit Risk 
 
Other items 2247 0 2247 1703 0 1703 1454 0 1454 76% 85% 
Securitisation 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0   
TOTAL 19765 0 19765 17585 0 17585 7727 0 7727 89% 44% 
a.  Gov + Institutions   34%   38%   2% 100% 2% 
b.  Corporates   12%   11%   25% 87% 97% 
c.  Retail + Sec Mort on IP   36%   36%   40% 90% 48% 
d.  Others   19%   15%   33% 69% 100% 
 
 
Governments 
+ Institutions 
Corporates 
 
Retail + Secured by 
Mortgages on IP 
Others 
 
Overall 
P
o
rt
u
g
a
l 
Original Exposure 25,1% 23,6% 39,0% 12,3%  
CCF multiplier 99,0% 76,3% 89,7% 73,0% 86,2% 
Exposure Value 28,8% 20,7% 40,5% 9,9%   
RW multiplier 13,7% 89,5% 37,7% 154,3% 50,2% 
Risk Exposure 7,6% 34,7% 31,4% 26,3%   
C
lu
st
er
s 
Original Exposure 29,5% 27,4% 33,8% 9,3%  
CCF multiplier 96,7% 75,2% 86,6% 85,2% 86,6% 
Exposure Value 32,5% 23,8% 35,1% 8,6%   
RW multiplier 11,9% 75,3% 40,6% 105,0% 40,1% 
Risk Exposure 11,3% 41,8% 30,4% 16,5%  
